I’m reading The Evangelical Universalist by Gregory MacDonald as research for an article on universalism that I’m writing. (MacDonald is a pseudonym for Robin Parry.) On page 38, MacDonald—citing Thomas Talbott—lists three propositions:
- It is God’s redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore his will) to reconcile all sinners to himself.
- It is within God’s power to achieve his redemptive purpose for the world.
- Some sinners will never be reconciled to God, and God will therefore either consign them to a place of eternal punishment, from which there will be no hope of escape, or put them out of existence altogether.
Following Talbott, MacDonald argues that these three propositions seem to be grounded in Scripture and theology but form an inconsistent set. To overcome the inconsistency, Calvinists deny (1), Arminians deny (2), and universalists deny (3). In other words, Calvinists believe God can save everyone but doesn’t want to. Arminians believe that God wants to save everyone but can’t. And universalists believe that God both wants to and can save everyone.
I am an Arminian, soteriologically speaking, so I am committed to the denial of (2), although I have some quibbles with how MacDonald formulates it. I believe that what limits God’s ability to achieve his redemptive purpose is the sinful exercise of free will by human beings. God cannot redeem those who resist being redeemed. For Calvinists and universalists, free will cannot hinder God achieving his purposes. This means that Calvinists locate the fact that not all are saved within God’s choices, rather than humanity’s. But what kind of loving God would refuse to save all people if he could? The answer to that rhetorical question is “no kind,” and it explains why I’m not a Calvinist.
Universalists also deny human free will, or at least the notion that God cannot override sinful human choices in pursuit of some good. On page 23, MacDonald writes, “It is hard to see that libertarian freedom is so precious that it cannot be temporarily overridden in such dire circumstances.” In other words, if the Arminian says, “People are in hell because they have made choices whose natural consequence is hell,” the universalist will respond, “Being in heaven is a greater good than having free will, so God will override free will and bring hell’s residents to heaven.”
But the denial of free will carries costs, it seems to me. Consider the issue of horrendous suffering that many experience in this lifetime, due to chronic illness, extreme poverty, victimization in wartime, or natural disaster. If universalism is true, then God desires the best for people and has the ability to realize that desire. Now, when people experience horrendous suffering, as they surely do, Calvinists may say that suffering is part of God’s purpose, and Arminians may say that God cannot remove this suffering because it is the natural consequence of human free will. But universalists, having denied both Calvinism and Arminianism, cannot resort to either argument. God both wants the best for people and can realize it. So why do people experience tremendous suffering?
In MacDonald’s terms, why would God, knowing that Adam and Eve’s sinful choice would lead to horrendous suffering, not override their free will and have them choose obedience rather than disobedience? If God could do this, why wouldn’t he? As far as I can tell, universalists have no good answer.
GeorgePWood.com 
Thank you for this wonderful and thought provoking article.
However, as a universalist, I must take issue with your characterization of “free-will” and “universal election”. you approach this from an “either/or” perspective, when in fact, “free-will” is a “both/and” proposition.
There is both election and free will in human life, or rather there is a very finite period of relative “free-will” sandwiched between absolute beginnings where free-will is not present.
In other words, “free-will” is a brief blip of choice on the grand scale of election.
For example:
You have no choice whether you are born.
You have no choice who your parents are.
You have no choice where you are born.
You have no choice in your economic class at birth.
You have no choice in your health conditions at birth.
You have no choice in your skin color, gender, eye color, hair color.
You have no choice in whether you fall ill or not.
You have no choice if you die.
You have no choice when you die.
All the other little things that “libertarians” cling to are simply minute instances of “free-will” sandwiched between massively important events without choice.
Therefore, we do not hesitate to deny #3. Why would that one thing be left up to choice, when all the other components of life were not?
You do not choose to live (which enables the soul to sin), you do not choose to die, and you do not choose to be saved.
Trig:
Thank you for your graciously written comment! It is a fine example of how we can agree without being disagreeable.
I wonder, however, whether your comment has made my point. In other words, I wonder whether your examples prove rather than disprove my point about universalism.
The point of your examples, after all, is that there are numerous examples of instances where we don’t exercise choice. And that is true. But someone–or perhaps Someone–does. I did not choose whether to be born, but my parents chose to give me birth. I did not choose to be saved (but isn’t faith a kind of choosing?), but God chose to save me.
Now, the question I want to ask you is whether God had a choice regarding all these things. Did he, for example, choose to create a world in which he knew that people would experience horrendous suffering? The answer is either yes or no. If the answer is yes–and if we further stipulate that God could have chosen not to create the world–then we are back at the problem with universalism I identified. God has both the will and the power to make people experience good things. Whence, therefore, horrendous suffering? If the answer is no, then there is indeed some thing that exercises its power independently of God and makes certain choices impossible for him.
Either way, I stand by my conclusion that universalism faces a problem of evil based on its affirmation of God’s good will and irresistible power.
Again, you are forcing a black and white view, and “either/or” view where there is none. Yes, there is human suffering because of our limited free-will. But that same free-will clearly does not apply to before-life or after-death.
What is suffering? Almost all suffering is a result of our human actions (or lack thereof). If a child refuses to listen to a parent, is the parent flawed? Not necessarily. Just the same, our inability or refusal to follow the will of God does not make God impotent or evil.
But none of that means that we are not saved. We have the choice to disobey, but not to be unsaved after death.
“If a child refuses to listen to a parent, is the parent flawed?” Depends on what the parent is asking the child to do, right? If a flawed parent asks a child to beat up his playmate, then the parent is surely flawed, and the child absolutely right in refusing to listen to him. But, of course, God never asks his children to do evil, so if we do evil, the flaw does not flow upward to God. I believe that. I’m an Arminian, after all.
But can a universalist believe this? Remember what MacDonald wrote about overriding free will: “It is hard to see that libertarian freedom is so precious that it cannot be temporarily overridden in such dire circumstances.” Now, clearly, on universalist terms, God can override human free will. The question is, why doesn’t he? If he can override human free will when a woman’s boyfriend sexually molests his girlfriend’s daughter, why doesn’t he? If he can override the free will of those Nazis who implemented Hitler’s “Final Solution” and killed millions, why doesn’t he? If he can override the financially malfeasant choices that have brought our nation to its economic knees, exacerbating the suffering of the poor, why doesn’t he? As an Arminian, I believe that free will limits the exercise of God’s power. But as a universalist, you don’t have this belief. Nothing can hinder God from achieving his purposes. So, unless his purposes include sexual abuse, genocide, and economic malfeasance, why doesn’t God override the human choices that lead to horrendous suffering?
This is the best reponse I have ever read in my life to the Calvinist and Universalist viewpoints on salvation and eternal punishment. It is God’s will that “ALL men be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth,” (I Tim. 2:4), but man must accept God’s offer of grace and forgiveness through the born again experience (John 3). There is only one plan of salvation (Acts 4:12).
Spot on. Why do people struggle accepting that God cannot violate who he is? He is love and love cannot exist outside of free will. Good stuff, George.
George-
Thanks for your thoughts, and for going through a work like this! I think there are a couple of extra ways to go about dealing with the 3 premises. I wouldn’t grant the biblicality of (1). Scripture calls that “God’s will,” but there are various ways of understanding that notion while at the same time granting souls in hell and God’s will being done. I would not accept (automatically) that the Bible states (as a simple blanket truth) that universal salvation is God’s redemptive purpose.
Secondly, I think we can take the three premises as NOT an inconsistent set if we add, (4) By decree of God’s will and power, human free moral agency means any human can reject God’s grace. I think your thoughts on universalism and their problem with free will are on the mark.
Again, I am NOT arguing that free-will does not exist in this life. Just not beyond. In all of the horrible examples of human agency gone awry that you gave, we must see that God does act in those situations, but through human agency also.
http://www.epochalypsis.org/2011/jesus-fell-asleep-in-the-storm
If we expect God to act through deeds of power and might, we are going to miss the unmistakable intervention right before us.