I’m reading The Evangelical Universalist by Gregory MacDonald as research for an article on universalism that I’m writing. (MacDonald is a pseudonym for Robin Parry.) On page 38, MacDonald—citing Thomas Talbott—lists three propositions:
- It is God’s redemptive purpose for the world (and therefore his will) to reconcile all sinners to himself.
- It is within God’s power to achieve his redemptive purpose for the world.
- Some sinners will never be reconciled to God, and God will therefore either consign them to a place of eternal punishment, from which there will be no hope of escape, or put them out of existence altogether.
Following Talbott, MacDonald argues that these three propositions seem to be grounded in Scripture and theology but form an inconsistent set. To overcome the inconsistency, Calvinists deny (1), Arminians deny (2), and universalists deny (3). In other words, Calvinists believe God can save everyone but doesn’t want to. Arminians believe that God wants to save everyone but can’t. And universalists believe that God both wants to and can save everyone.
I am an Arminian, soteriologically speaking, so I am committed to the denial of (2), although I have some quibbles with how MacDonald formulates it. I believe that what limits God’s ability to achieve his redemptive purpose is the sinful exercise of free will by human beings. God cannot redeem those who resist being redeemed. For Calvinists and universalists, free will cannot hinder God achieving his purposes. This means that Calvinists locate the fact that not all are saved within God’s choices, rather than humanity’s. But what kind of loving God would refuse to save all people if he could? The answer to that rhetorical question is “no kind,” and it explains why I’m not a Calvinist.
Universalists also deny human free will, or at least the notion that God cannot override sinful human choices in pursuit of some good. On page 23, MacDonald writes, “It is hard to see that libertarian freedom is so precious that it cannot be temporarily overridden in such dire circumstances.” In other words, if the Arminian says, “People are in hell because they have made choices whose natural consequence is hell,” the universalist will respond, “Being in heaven is a greater good than having free will, so God will override free will and bring hell’s residents to heaven.”
But the denial of free will carries costs, it seems to me. Consider the issue of horrendous suffering that many experience in this lifetime, due to chronic illness, extreme poverty, victimization in wartime, or natural disaster. If universalism is true, then God desires the best for people and has the ability to realize that desire. Now, when people experience horrendous suffering, as they surely do, Calvinists may say that suffering is part of God’s purpose, and Arminians may say that God cannot remove this suffering because it is the natural consequence of human free will. But universalists, having denied both Calvinism and Arminianism, cannot resort to either argument. God both wants the best for people and can realize it. So why do people experience tremendous suffering?
In MacDonald’s terms, why would God, knowing that Adam and Eve’s sinful choice would lead to horrendous suffering, not override their free will and have them choose obedience rather than disobedience? If God could do this, why wouldn’t he? As far as I can tell, universalists have no good answer.
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